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Abstract

In 1998, the Philippines introduced book-building pricing mechanisms for Initial
Public Offerings. Almost all capital raised through IPOs in the Philippines is done using a
book-building pricing method, however a significant number of IPOs still occur using
non-book-building methods. Understanding why book-building has become the dominant
pricing mechanism but yet non-book-building methods still survive is the aim of this
paper. I find that unlike other countries where the introduction of book-building leads to
higher total issue costs for individual issuers and unlike theory which suggests the
increased effort of book-building should come with increased costs, IPOs that use bookbuilt pricing in the Philippines actually have a lower total issue cost as a percentage of the
total issue size compared to issuers who use non-book-building methods. This being the
case, explaining why non-book-built IPOs still occur is even more interesting. I find that
the large variance in size and the low volume of IPOs in the Philippines creates a
bifurcated market where it is uneconomical for underwriters to use book-building to
service small firms who want to IPO. The harder phenomenon to explain is the choice by
firms who are large enough to book-build to use non-book-built methods. I suggest that
the developing sophistication of the local market as well as the relationship driven aspect
of business in the Philippines are two possible explanations.
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I.

Introduction
Though public offerings have been out of fashion in the US market recently with

large private funding rounds allowing companies to stave off an appetite for the public
markets, the Initial Public Offering (IPO) market in Asia-Pacific hasn’t gotten the memo.
The APAC region leads in terms of deal number and proceeds through the first 9 months
of 2015 and Japan is on course to have the best year for IPOs since 20071.
An Initial Public Offering is the first offering of a company’s equity to public
investors and is a major source of capital for growing firms. The decision to IPO is a
major event in the life of any company. IPOs are complex processes that can take several
months as the company works with their retained teams of several parties including
banks, law firms and accountants on the offering. Arguably the biggest decision the
offering firm has to make after making the decision to IPO is how to price the offering. In
a small set of countries, regulatory bodies only allow one type of pricing method.
Indonesia, for example, only allows companies to IPO using a fixed-price mechanism.
The majority of countries with functioning public equity markets however allow firms to
choose between the three types of pricing methods or a combination of them, these being:
fixed2, auction, and book-building. Globally, book-building is the pricing method of
choice. Sherman (2000) shows that in more than forty markets where book-building is
available it has become the pricing mechanism of choice. Understanding why has been
1

"EY - IPO Global Trends 2015 Q2 - Asia-Pacific Is the Standout Region." Ernst Young. Accessed
November 30, 2015. http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Strategic-Growth-Markets/ey-ipo-global-trends2015-q2-asia-pacific-is-the-standout-region.
2

By “fixed price”, I refer to any method where the final offer price is determined through calculations
performed by the underwriter. The calculations and formulas used do not have to be standardized however
and thus the fixed price calculation for one IPO may be different from another.

1

the subject of various different theoretical and empirical studies which will be explored in
more depth in section 2 of this paper.
Nevertheless, the consensus so far seems to be that in developed markets the
benefits of pricing via book-building are clear empirically. In the US (whether the bookbuilding system originated) or Japan for example, there has been little push back on the
dominance of book-building. Attempts to disrupt the system by firms such as W.R.
Hambrecht who offers auction-priced IPOs in the US have resulted in, at most, moderate
success. In developing markets however there the evidence is still unclear as to whether
book-building has helped the market. In India, Kumar (2008) finds that from a total cost
point of view, issuers are neither better nor worse off under the Indian book-building
system. In Bangladesh, Islam et al. (2006) find that the benefits to the market are unclear
given the shortage of large, sophisticated investors and in 2011 Bangladeshi regulators
suspended book-building as a pricing mechanism, blaming it for the market debacle that
the country experienced in 2010.
As a student of the developed markets but a native of the Philippines, whether or
not a recently introduced financial mechanism makes the market, its participants and
ultimately the greater economy better or worse off concerns me on a personal level. This
study seeks to add value to the developing field of literature on the topic in the
Philippines by answering two questions: 1) Why do most firms in the Philippines choose
to use a book-building method as opposed to a non-book-building method (including
auctions, fixed-price or any other method that does not use an explicit book-building
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process) and 2) What firm-specific variables predict whether a firm will use bookbuilding pricing methods or non-book-building pricing methods.
II. Literature Review
A significant volume of literature is devoted to trying to explain why the
overwhelming majority of issuers elect to use book-building mechanisms rather than
auctions or fixed price offerings when they have the choice of using any of the three.
Broadly, in markets free markets where IPO pricing isn’t directly determined by
regulators, there are three major parties that could influence the decision. The first is the
investors in the market whose response to different IPOs influences the type of IPOs the
market chooses, the second is the underwriting banks who provide the pricing services
and will usually recommend a certain type to the issuing company if retained, and third is
the issuing company themselves who directly makes the decision of what type of IPO to
pursue.
Jagannathan et al. (2010) hypothesize that it is investors, specifically
sophisticated and institutional investors that make up most of the market volumn, that
drive the decision and that the difficulty associated with auction based methods leads to
investor behavior that is detrimental to the issuer. They argue that the primary investors
in the market, large institutional investors, discourage non-book-built pricing methods
since they allocate shares on a prorata basis leading to a smaller allocation on average for
institutional investors compared to book-building. Furthermore, Jagannathan and
Sherman (2006) in another paper argue that the free rider problem and winner’s curse
discourage informed investors from participating in auction-based IPOs. Informed
3

investors, usually institutional investors, prefer book-building because it rewards them for
their sophistication by getting more shares at a better price at the time of IPO since
underwriters take into account institutional investors’s information during the price
setting period. In an auction IPO, uninformed investors are also allowed to bid which
creates a lot of noise when setting the price and because shares are allocated from highest
bid to lowest, investors who overbid not only move the price away from the “correct”
price but also take away potential allocation from those who bid at the “correct” price. In
terms of fixed-price offerings, even if bids aren’t solicited from uninformed investors, all
sophisticated investors still aren’t rewarded for their information and thus, as Sherman
(2005) puts it, they feel like their time evaluating the offer is wasted.
Alternatively, some authors argue it is the underwriting banks that drive the
choice of regime. Ausubel (2002) states that investment banks have an incentive to
pressure issuers to choose book-building because of the higher fees banks receive in
return for the additional effort and time spent on book-built offerings. Additionally, as
documented by Sherman (2002), given that underwriters determine the allocation of the
shares in a book-built process and there is strong evidence that underwriters underprice3,
banks also have the incentive to pressure issuers to use book-building so that they can
allocate the underpriced shares to important clients in order to build and deepen
relationships. Degeorge et al. (2007) states that the information gathering process of
book-building, which includes public presentations of the company by management and
more disclosure of company information prior to final pricing, and longer time frame
3

Ausubel (2002), Aggarwal et al. (2001), Hanley and Hoberg (2011) all find underpricing in their samples
of book-built IPOs and cite causes such as litigation risk for underwriting banks and a desire for issuers to
see a “pop” as reasons for systematic underpricing
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results in more coverage from analysts. This enhances the demand for the deal, but also
gives the underwriters themselves more publicity and better relationships with analysts.
The last major stakeholder that could drive the decision is issuers themselves.
Sherman (2002) finds that expected number of shares sold under book-building is higher,
risk of undersubscription is lower, and book-building allows the issuer to control
spending on information acquisition (thus giving control over expected proceeds). In an
expansion of her paper, Sherman (2005) concludes that because more control over the
offering and less risk are qualities sought by any issuer, this explains why global trends of
issuer choice of book-building are so consistent. After looking at the case of Japan,
Kutsuna and Smith (2003) argue that net issue proceeds are what determine the regime
that results in the most capital raised from the IPO minus total issue costs. Because the
individual total issue cost of most issuers in their sample is higher under book-building,
individual total issue costs savings cannot explain the shift to book-building and
individual issuer preference alone cannot answer the why book-building seems to drive
all auctions out of favor in Japan. Kutsuna and Smith conclude that the benefits to the
whole market and not a specific group of stakeholders due to the lower aggregate total
issue cost (when results are weighted by issue size rather than equally weighting and
taking into account opportunity costs related to underinvestment) and due to partly
redistributive effects of more-accurate pricing is what determines the regime of IPO
pricing that prevails. Kutsuna and Smith however end on the statement that whether or
not there is a role for other IPO processes outside book-building “depends partly on the
mix of potential issuers”.

5

Considering previous literature reveals nuances to the questions of why bookbuilding becomes the pricing mechanism of choice and what firms choose it. First, it
seems undisputed that book-building should result in less uncertainty and thus better
performance of IPOs, the tradeoff in other markets however is the higher cost associated
with book-building. Thus examining whether the tradeoff exists in the Philippine market
and, assuming it does, assessing whether the higher costs are justified is one of the
important objectives of this paper. Second, the benefits of book-building are repeatedly
found to be dependent on the scale of issuing firms, whether that be in terms of issue size
or market cap, and the information asymmetry associated with the company. Thus,
another important objective in this paper is examining whether the size of a firm and the
amount of information asymmetry of a firm in the Philippines predict the decision to
book-build. In the pursuit of these objectives, understanding the institutional backdrop of
the Philippines is of high importance.
III. Institutional Overview4
The Philippine stock market:
The current Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE), the sole stock exchange in the
Philippines, started in 1992 as a result of the unification of the Manila Stock exchange,
which was organized in 1927, and the Makati Stock Exchange, which was organized in
1963. Companies on the exchange are classified according to 7 sector categories:
financial, industrial, holding firms, property, services, and mining and oil. As of June 8

4

As a result of poor online documentation of many PSE and SEC requirements, most information is taken
from interviews with industry professionals which are cited in the References section.
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2015, there were 263 companies listed with an aggregate market capitalization of
14,496B Php5.
Originally, companies IPO-ed and were listed on the First Board, Secord Board,
or the Small and Medium Enterprises Board with the board determined by profitability,
growth, market capitalization, age and net tangible assets. In 2013, the PSE adopted a
new listing board structure, consolidating the 3 previous boards into the Main Board and
the SME Board each with more comprehensive listing requirements. In general, larger
companies with longer operating histories are listed on the Main Board while smaller and
younger companies are listed on the SME Board (for more details refer to tables 1 and 2).
Tax considerations:
Preferential tax treatment is granted to sales of shares during an IPO. A tax rate of
50bps of transaction value is applied during the IPO compared to the capital gains tax of
10% - 20% one would have to pay on the sale of shares normally. In exchange for this
preferential tax treatment policy, the government set in place IPO distribution
requirements intended to allow Filipino retail customers to share in the upside of the
company.
IPO distribution requirements:
In general, the SEC requires underwriters to distribute 20% of the base deal to
Trading Participants (TP’s) who are a collection of mostly small, PSE-registered brokers,
10% to local small investors (LSI’s) with the remaining 70% to be sold to the general

5

http://www.pse.com.ph/stockMarket/marketInfo-marketActivity.html?tab=0
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public (the majority of this tranche is usually allocated to Qualified Institutional Buyers
(QIB’s)). This 70% allocation to QIBs is also referred to as the book-building process
however this does not refer to the pricing process of the IPO rather it just refers to the
determination of allocation. Taking a fixed price IPO as an example, the price may be
determined through a fixed-price method however if the offering is oversubscribed,
meaning the number of shares demanded by investors is greater than the number of
shares being sold, how many shares each QIB receives is determined through what is also
called the book-building process. These percentage distribution requirements are unique
to the Philippines and both underwriters and the PSE have called for reform for what they
say is an antiquated and unfair securities code. Underwriters claim the option for TP’s to
return their allocation to underwriters essentially gives the trading participants a free
option on the shares. Furthermore, the 10% allocation requirement to small local
investors frustrates underwriters due to the low take-up rates from the tranche (which can
be as low as 2%). In practice, this motivates underwriters to prefer a book-building
pricing mechanism since it allows them to try and get demand to cover 100% of the deal
with institutional investors so that the deal is still covered in the case of weak demand
from the TP and LSI tranches.
Listing by way of introduction:
Listing by way of introduction applies to situations where a company will list on
the PSE but no public offering will be undertaken because the securities for which the
listing is sought would be of such an amount and would be so widely held that their
adequate marketability when listed can be assumed. Broadly, listing by way of
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introduction can also occur when listing in an exchange or public offering is mandated by
law or be the SEC or other government agencies.
The non-book-building regime:
Pre-1998, IPO issuers in the Philippines had the choice between fixed-price,
auction, or hybrid offering methods. With a fixed-price offering, if the company was to
be listed on the Third Board the shares of the company were required to be priced at par
value (1 Php). Most companies however listed on the First or Second Boards where the
underwriter would determine a price based on their own determined factors such as PE
ratio, prevailing market conditions, historical performance, estimates of the business
potential and earnings prospects, assessment of company's management and
consideration of above factors in relation to the market valuation of companies in related
businesses. This price would be the final price shares were offered to investors at during
an IPO.
In contrast, with an auction-price offering, bids which are solicited from investors
who want allocation from the IPO are used to set the price of the shares. A hybrid-price
offering would be an IPO that utilizes both methods to set the price of different tranches
of shares during the offering. During the non-book-building regime, fixed price offerings
dominated. In fact, in my data set only one company during the non-book-building
regime did not use the fixed price method.6 During this regime, pricing methods did not
prevent systematic underpricing. Sullivan and Unite (1998) found that during the 11 year
period of 1987-1997 first day initial returns of 104 IPOs averaged 22.69%.
6

Petron Corporation’s (PCOR) IPO in Sept. 1994 utilized a hybrid-price offering, with a fixed-price
offering tranche and a “tender-price” offering tranche (auction-based)
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The book-building regime:
Under book-building, the underwriter gathers information from primarily
institutional investors. Similar to the fixed-price method, the underwriter will
independently determine a price range that they expect the IPO to price at. Subsequently,
unlike other pricing methods, through discussions undergone during a “road show”, a
typically one to two week long process that involves management presentations and oneon-one meetings with selected investors, the underwriter will assess the level of interest /
demand from investors and determine where in the range the price should be set. The
higher the demand, the closer to the upper part of the price range the offering price is set.
In exceptional cases, the underwriter may even chose to create a new range of prices if
demand turns out to be much higher or lower than expected. In the case of exceptionally
low demand, the issuer may choose not to issue, thus firms that end up IPO-ing usually
price within the expected range or better. Under the Philippine book-building method, the
offer price need not be linked to the value of comparable companies. Furthermore,
perhaps the biggest differentiator for book-building is that gives underwriters greater
control over allocation of the shares. Under non-book-building mechanisms shares are
allocated prorata, however in the book-building process the underwriter has discretion
over the allocation of the shares. This incentivizes truthful bids from investors during a
book-building process as their potential reward is the allocation of underpriced shares, as
discussed in Benveniste and Spindt (1989). Thus while nothing bars underwriters from
going on a roadshow and asking for indications of interests during a non-book-building
process, because underwriters have no control over allocation investors have no incentive
to give accurate representations of price. In general, the book-building process is
10

associated with higher effort on the part on the underwriter to market the IPO and gather
information on demand.
The IPO of Philippine Seven Corporation (SEVN) in February 1998 is the first
time a book-building method is mentioned in regards to setting the offering price of the
IPO. It is unclear what specifically motivated the introduction of book-building pricing,
however the time period of the late 1990’s was a time of major change in the Philippine
markets and in East Asian markets in general, among these changes were: The increase in
Western institutional investors opening East Asian (ex-Japan) emerging market funds and
migration of talent from Wall Street and London to Asia, increase in privations which
needed broader and deeper institutional investor support, the Asian Financial Crisis of
1997-2004 and the emergence of smaller, earlier-stage companies. These factors point to
a spread of Western capital markets knowledge, a growing sophistication in institutional
investors and an era of increased complexity and uncertainty in the public markets. Bookbuilding, which gives underwriters and issuers more control over the offering and relies
on sizable and knowledged institutional investors, would logically be a sought after tool.
Sherman’s (2002) empirical findings that book-building has become the preferred pricing
method for IPOs in 44 countries and Ljungqvist et al’s (2003) and Sherman’s (2005)
conclusions that book-building tends to drive out other pricing methods in markets that it
has been introduced are testaments to this. While companies still have the option of
choosing fixed-price or auction-based pricing methods, Book-building since introduction
has become the favored method of IPO pricing in the Philippines with 42 out of the 70
IPOs from 1998-2015 choosing to use a book-building process. Nevertheless, unlike
markets like Japan where book-building since introduction has completely driven out
11

other pricing methods, the Philippine market still has a significant amount of IPO’s
utilizing non-book-building methods. As can be seen in figure 5, the prominence of bookbuilding has grown as time has progressed however even in recent years non-book-built
offerings are still observable.
IV. Data Description
To study the book-building regime in the Philippines, I use a sample of all 70
companies that IPO-ed on the PSE from the start of 1998 through August of 2015. The
data set does not include companies that listed by way of introduction or listed through
way of a reverse merger7 due to the significantly different nature of the transactions. As
can be seen in figure 5, over recent years there still have been a number of non-book-built
IPOs however, as figure 6 shows, they make up a small amount of the volume.
Data on proceeds, price, board, sector, aftermarket price and market cap at
issuance was provided by the library of the PSE. Additional details such as historical
financials, nature of shareholders, underwriter details and fees, use of proceeds, firm age,
number of employees, and classification of pricing mechanism were collected from the
final prospectuses filed with the PSE by the IPO-ing companies. Underwriter fees are
inclusive of fees paid to selling agents due to most prospectuses not stating the distinct
portion that would go only to the underwriters. IPOs were classified as either book-built
or non-book-built by looking at the “Determination of Offer Price” section of each
prospectus. While the wording of the section is left to the discretion of the issuer and its
advisors, the SEC requires firms to explicitly mention if a book-building process was
7

The acquisition of a listed public company by a private company
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used to price the shares (as can be seen in figure 4). Thus if a prospectus did not
explicitly mention book-building in the “Determination of Offer Price” section, examples
of which can be found in figure 1 and 2, then the IPO was classified as non-book-built.
Table 3 shows a summary of the data divided by book-built IPOs and non-bookbuilt IPOs. Additionally, because of the historically observed difference in performance
of IPOs of public utilities, the results for book-built and non-book-built IPOs excluding
three IPOs of privatized public utility and public financial companies 8, which are the only
privatizations in the sample, were also generated. Because the differences of mean values
in this no-privatizations sample from the sample containing all IPOs were found not to be
statistically significant, the generated statistics for the no-privatizations sample are not
shown.
Capital market uncertainty:
Capital market uncertainly is a possible reason firms would elect to use a bookbuilding method rather than a non-book-building method. To measure capital market
uncertainty, I measure the runup of the market index over the 90 day period prior to the
final issue date of the IPO. The market index I use is the Philippine Stock Exchange
Index (PSEi) which is the main index of the PSE and is comprised of a fixed basket of the
30 largest and most active common stocks on the PSE.
Issuers want to ensure there is adequate demand for the offering and that the issue
is priced correctly. Book-building’s process of information gathering reduces uncertainty

8

Manila Water Corporation (2005), Electric Development Corporation (2006) and National Reinsurance
Corporation of the Philippines (2007)
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regarding demand for the issuance and allows the underwriter to easily revise the price.
Panel a in table 3 gives evidence for this theory, showing that on average there is a larger
amount of uncertainty during periods when book-built IPOs occur.
Issue cost:
In answering the question of why book-building is preferred by issuers, previous
literature from developed markets suggests there is a trade-off between the higher issue
cost associated with book-building due the higher effort expended by the underwriter,
and the benefits of greater information on demand. Congruent with other studies on issue
cost such as that of Kutsuna and Smith (2003), I define total issue cost as the sum of
underwriting fees and underpricing. In panel b of table 3 I standardize total issue costs by
offer price as is commonly done. Kutsuna and Smith (2003) however argue that this
standardization technique econometrically weights outlier issues too heavily and that
conceptually, total issue cost is better measured as the percentage difference between
market value and net issue proceeds. Thus, in panel c of table 3 I standardize total issue
cost by the first aftermarket price.
In contrast to most literature from developed countries on total issue cost between
book-building and non-book-building IPOs, my data shows that book-building is than
non-book-building from a total issue cost perspective. Looking at the components of total
issue cost, underwriter fees is not the driver of the difference in cost with underwriter fees
set at about 3.1% for both book-building and non-book-building. This is consistent with
my interviews with industry professionals who cite intense competition and the SEC
mandated cap on underwriter fees of 5% of issue size as the reasons for the tight band
14

around fees. Thus, the driver of the difference in total issue cost in the Philippines is
underpricing. Compared to underpricing as measured by first day initial returns in the US
from 1980-2001 as measured by Ritter and Welch (2002) of 20%, and Kutsuna and Smith
(2003) in Japan of 36%, underpricing in my data set is significantly less at around 11%
across all IPOs.
Given the advantage of book-building of greater information, less uncertainty and
the ability to allocate shares, it is puzzling why underwriters would not charge a premium
above non-bookbuilt offerings or why an issuer would have chosen a non-bookbuilt
option if they appear to be more expensive. Practitioners from large banks in the
Philippines point to size of the offering as the explanation. Speaking with an investment
banker from Deutsche Bank in the Philippines and another at Bank of the Philippine
Islands Capital Markets, both said that their banks did not look at deals the size of those
that were non-bookbuilt in my data set as the economics did not make sense even if
priced at the 5% underwriter fee cap.
Offering size:
Looking at panel d of table 3, the difference in offering size between book-built
and non-book-built IPOs corroborates the colloquial evidence taken from the interviews
with practitioners. In terms of total capital raised, primary capital raised, and secondary
capital raised, bookbuilt offerings are at least one order of magnitude larger than nonbookbuilt offerings. Correspondingly, this means an order of magnitude of order
difference in underwriting fees. Even with the lesser amount of work required from an
underwriter during a non-bookbuilt deal, the smaller economics of non-bookbuilt deals in
15

the Philippines means that most of the larger banks do not participate in the market. This
leaves the space open to more niche competitors who may have different cost structures
that allow the economics of the small, non-bookbuilt deals to work. Abacus Capital and
Investment Corporation, ranked 115th in the Philippine Equity deals league table
according to Bloomberg by deal volume since 1999, performed 1 of every 3 nonbookbuilt deals in the sample and has been the lead underwriter on the last five nonbookbuilt deals in the country. In general, it seems that there is less of a “choice” for
issuers between book-building and non-book-building which helps to explain the
conundrum with total issue costs. Small issuers, even if willing to pay in the upper range
of fees, are overlooked by banks who have the resources and network of investors to
perform a book-building process and thus turn to niche underwriters to IPO. These niche
firms, with less competition from traditional underwriters, are able to charge a slight
premium in fees. Conversely, traditional underwriters who book-build offerings face
more competition (increasingly from large multinational banks) and thus are unable to
charge a higher fee.
Additionally, panel d seems to refute the statement that issuers looking to simply
exit their investment in a company and thus don’t care about the aftermarket performance
of the shares would choose a non-bookbuilt option. The amount of secondary proceeds as
a percentage of total equity in non-bookbuilt offerings is less than that in book-built
offerings. Given the low cost of book-building in the Philippines, it can be speculated that
the lower amount of underpricing from bookbuilt IPOs (and thus less money left on the
table) outweighs the lower fee that issuers would pay if they elected to use a non-bookbuilt IPO.
16

Company characteristics:
The last panel of table 3, panel e, displays the company characteristics of issuing
companies. Unsurprisingly, given the results related to offer size, larger companies in
terms of market cap, who tend to have more employees and a longer operating tenure,
elect to use book-building more. In terms of operating metrics, column 2 which includes
all 28 observations of non-bookbuilt IPOIs is misleading due to the inclusion of the 2007
IPO of Anchor Land Holdings, Inc (ALHI) which IPO-ed with 381B Php in revenue and
a net income of 56B Php. Removing the outlier in column 3 gives a clearer picture of the
data and doesn’t change any of the conclusions mentioned above so far. The only
material difference is in the mean of sales revenue, net income and sales growth for nonbookbuilt firms. Once again, as expected with a sample of younger, smaller firms, the
mean amount of revenue and income for companies that choose not to book-build are
significantly less than those who do. Correspondingly, these non-book-built have higher
sales growth metrics.
While the benefits of book-building seem most suited to firms with high
asymmetric information, such as new, smaller, high growth firms, these types of firms
seem to use non-book-building methods. As discussed above, the lack of choice may be
driving these high-information asymmetry firms to use non-book-building methods.
Given this, as can be seen in figure 8, it is no surprise that the vast majority of firms that
have IPO-ed in the Small and Medium Enterprise sector (SME) decided not to bookbuild.

17

V. Regression Results
To further empirically investigate the choice to bookbuild and determination of
issue costs, I regress select company and issue characteristics against the binary variable
of bookbuilt versus non-bookbuilt in tables 4 and 5, against underwriter fees in table 6
and against underpricing in table 6. All regressions exclude the outlier of ALHI due to the
reasons previously mentioned.
The choice to book-build:
Table 3 presents the results of a linear regression with the binary choice to bookbuild or not as the dependent variable and select company and offering characteristics.
The regression gives similar results to Kumar (2008) in the Indian market who found that
only size and underwriter’s reputation were statistically significant in determining
whether a firm chose to use a book-building process or not. I omit my measure of
underwriter reputation, a binary variable of whether or not the underwriter was in the top
10 of the league table by deal volume, since all top 10 underwriters in my sample only
use book-building. My linear regression finds that only the constant is significant at the
1% level. Market cap and the SME sector are significant at the 5% level while the
property sector is significant at the 10% level.
For comparison, the marginal effects of a probit regression are displayed in Table
4. At the 10% level, age of the firm and the mining and oil sector are significant. At the
5% level, market cap is significant. At the 1% level the holding firm sector is significant.
Unlike the linear regression, has easily interpretable regression coefficients where a 1
unit change in the independent variable results in a percentage increase in the conditional
18

probability of the dependent variable occurring equal to the magnitude of the coefficient
on the independent variable, all else being equal. Using holding firms as an example,
because all holding firms in my sample chose to use book-building, the model predicts
that holding all other explanatory variables constant, a firm that registers their sector as a
holding company is 100% more likely to use book-building compared to a company that
does not register their sector as a holding company. Between the two regressions, only
market cap remains statistically significant. The sign is in the expected direction,
indicating that the larger the company, the more likely book-building is used.
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the marginal probability is extremely small. In order for a
the conditional probability of book-building to increase by 1.00%, the market cap (given
in mm Php) of a company would have to increase by about 50 trillion Php. Given that
the range between the largest IPO in the sample (Travelers International Hotel Group,
Inc.) and smallest (Information Capital Technology Ventures) is about 180B, the
magnitude of the effect of market cap seems insignificant once other variables are
controlled for.
Interestingly, a more sophisticated shareholder base at the time of IPO, proxied
here by a firm having a large amount of foreign shareholders and / or having the majority
of the firm owned by non-individuals (such as funds or other companies) and / or being a
subsidiary of a foreign corporation, does not seem to be significant in determining the
book-building decision. Worth noting as well is that in both regressions, the secondary
proceeds as a percentage of the market value of equity at the time of offering just misses
being significant at the 10% level, coming in at between 11% - 12% in the linear and
probit models. The sign is the opposite direction than expected. An offering with a large
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secondary amount would mean a large amount of shareholders looking to liquidate their
investment in the company. It could be argued that these shareholders would not care
about the aftermarket performance of the shares of the company and thus they would not
be willing to pay for the more accurate pricing of book-building. In this case however, it
can be speculated that for companies that have the option of using both book-built and
non-bookbuilt methods, the increase in secondary proceeds from greater marketing and
less underpricing associated with book-building outweighs the cost savings that would
come with using a non-book-built process.
Total issue cost:
The observation from the summary statistics in table 3 that book-building does
not have a higher total issue cost than non-book-building is puzzling. The more effort that
the underwriter expends on due diligence and the better their reputation, the more they
should be able to charge either in the direct form of higher fees, or in the form of greater
underpricing which represents a lower cost of investment in marketing and information
gathering. The larger the problem of asymmetric information, the greater the effort
required on both the marketing and information gathering front. Firms with longer track
records and larger revenues should be arguably more well-known and less difficult to
market and perform due diligence on. Furthermore if underwriters are able to compete on
reputation and not just price, then they should justifiably be able to charge a premium.
Kutsuna and Smith (2003) find that with auction IPOs (non-bookbuilt) they are unable to
explain total issue cost, however with book-built IPOs the factors above are significant.
They additionally find that the issue size is significant in determining total issue cost in
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book-built IPOs, implying an economies-of-scale effect for underwriting. I add the binary
variable of whether or not there is an international tranche of the issue, expecting that the
greater disclosure requirements and additional marketing should allow foreign
underwriters to charge a greater fee. Unfortunately, fees paid to in relation to
international offerings are not disclosed however an interview with an investment banker
at Deutsche Bank Philippines revealed that usually the disclosed fees to domestic
underwriters are similar to those paid to international ones. For the regression on
underpricing I also include underwriter fees which would be expected to be a factor in
determining the level of underpricing if the two are substitute components of total issue
cost and the determination of price would occur after agreement on the fee in the IPO
process. I standardize the data by issue price, so that the underwriter fee model is not
affected by underpricing.
Table 6 shows the linear regression results for total issue cost. Like Kutsuna and
Smith (2003), I am unable to explain total issue cost from both a fee and underpricing
perspective with only the constant being significant in both regressions. Unlike Kutsuna
and Smith (2003) however, I am also unable to explain total issue cost for book-built
issues as well. International and my measure of underwriter reputation, whether or not is
in the top 10 of the league table, have either their corresponding interacted or noninteracted variable omitted since all international offerings were book-built and top 10
underwriters only performed book-built IPOs. In aggregate, the model explains less than
25% of the variation in underwriting fees, however this lack of explanation, I believe, is a
useful result. The lack of effect of any variables that have explanatory power in
developed markets like Japan signals that underwriters, even those with global
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operations, operate differently in the Philippines. While it is argued underwriters should
favor book-building because it gives underwriters more control over their compensation
structure, it doesn’t seem that book-builders in the Philippines possess that form of
market power.
VI. Further empirical investigation
Given the entire sample of firms that have IPO-ed in the Philippines since the
introduction of book-building as a pricing method in 1998, I am led to four conclusions:
1) The size of a company determines whether a company uses book-building to price
their IPO or not, 2) however not small companies do not have the choice to book-build
due to the absence of service provided by underwriters who find their issue size
uneconomical. 3) Book-building is cheaper from a total issue cost perspective and has a
lower amount of underpricing. Along with the marketing and discretionary allocation
benefits book-building offers, this seems like a plausible explanation as to why bookbuilding has become the dominant pricing mechanism in the Philippines, however 4) I am
unable to empirically explain why book-building is has a lower issue cost as a percentage
of total offering proceeds.
The wide variance of firm size in the Philippines combined with the low volume
of deals creates the bifurcated market that leads to conclusion (2). Figure 13 charts the
logged market cap of all 70 firms against the binary decision variable of book-built or
not. At the edges, there is a clear tendency for the smallest firms to not use book-building
and for the largest firms to use book-building. There is an overlapping area however in
market caps with the magnitude of 100 mm Php to 10 B Php. This subset of firms is
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interesting given that they are firms of relatively equal size in terms of market cap who
presumably had the true choice of using book-built pricing or not. This may not be
precise given that it may be the case that over time more underwriters entered the bookbuilding market and thus allowed smaller firms to issue or that early in the period large
firms elected to still use the legacy non-book-built method because of lack of education
on the new method. Nevertheless the sample presents a better opportunity to study the
choice to book-build or not. To gain a rough empirical understanding of this set of firms,
I create an adhoc sample consisting 17 of firms that are in in one of the two buckets: 1)
used book-building and had a market cap less than 1 B Php, or 2) used non-book-building
and had a market cap greater than 1B Php.
Table 7 shows the results of the linear regression of the sample for the choice of
firms to book-build or not. Unlike the low explanatory power of the table 4 which
includes the whole sample of firms, the linear regression of the subset of firms has strong
explanatory power with an

over 90%. Market cap comes out significant again but with

a negative sign which is expected given that the sample was created so that all book-built
firms were smaller than non-book-built ones.

Interestingly, the only other variable

significant at the 10% level is the binary variable of large foreign shareholders. I define a
firm with a large amount of foreign shareholders to be a firm with more than 30% of its
common equity held by persons or institutions of a nationality outside of the Philippines
at the time of IPO. Given that book-building is relatively new to the Philippines but has
been used extensively abroad, and that foreign investors tend to be more sophisticated
than local Filipino investors, it makes sense that companies with more foreign investor
pressure would use a book-building process. This would also seem to imply, that as
23

Filipino businesses and investors continue to become more sophisticated, the existence of
non-book-building methods will tend in the same direction as countries like Japan and
become extremely scarce as companies that truly have the option of choosing their IPO
pricing mechanism elect to use the book-building method.
VII. Conclusion
While the continued moderate appearance of non-book-built IPOs in the Philippines over
recent years is a rarity on the global scale, the Philippines is not an exception to the rule
that is the tendency of book-building to dominate non-book-building methods in IPO
pricing. The heavy competition for business in South East Asia equity market, the
regulatory cap on fees, and the precedent set by historically low fees before bookbuilding increases willingness of domestic and international underwriters to accept lowsingle-digit fees. Interestingly, underwriters don’t seem to substitute lower fees with
more underpricing as is found abroad. Equally interesting, is the fact that investors are
willing to reveal truthful information to such an extent given the Philippine regulations
on allocation. Given that the argument for more accurate pricing under book-building is
the information gathered from (primarily) institutional investors, and that the incentive
for investors to reveal information is allocation, in a system that reduces the potential
allocation that institutional buyers can receive, one would expect there to be more
underpricing. Abnormally strong demand for Philippine public shares could be one
reason, looking at the run-up of the PSEi in figure 7 over the period supports the claim.
An alternative explanation is the youth of the market. Loughran and Ritter (2002) find
that in the US, average initial underpricing in 1980 was about 7% which is where the
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Philippines is now. Over the course of 20 years however the number rose to about 65%.
The increasing valuations of companies over time and agency problems between
underwriters and issuing firms are the primary factors they attribute this to. Figure 11
shows book-built IPO underpricing in the Philippines trending up as time has progressed,
suggesting that the infancy of the market is responsible for the anomaly of issue costs in
the market.
Nevertheless, given that book-building in the Philippines was cheaper from a total
issue cost perspective and results in better deal performance (figure 10 shows the
majority of deals for which oversubscription occurred where for book-built IPOs), what
explains why 40% of IPOs since 1998 didn’t use book-building?
The first reason is that very small firms with small offering sizes do not have
access to banks who offer book-building services. The percentage fees of small offerings
are unattractive to book-building banks and thus these offerings are overlooked. Because
the volume of deals is tight, the strategy of middle market banks, like those in the US,
who operate by doing more deals of smaller sizes, is also unviable. In addition, it is
difficult for a niche player to enter the space and provide book-building services to small
players due to the high barriers of entry that exist within the book-building space such as
a network of investors and relationships with advisors such as law firms (who the
underwriter can introduce to the issuer for the offering) both of which usually require
scale.
For firms large enough to choose between book-building and non-book-building,
the developing nature of the market and investors at a macro level and the concentration
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of foreign shareholders at a firm-specific level are possible explanations. Change can be
difficult, especially for a developing market with unclear regulations and processes. In
aspects, doing things as they have always been done is a viable argument. In support of
this, given the heavily relationship-driven nature of finance and the fact that only
domestic underwriters provide non-book-built offerings, legacy relationships could lead a
firm to choose not to use a book-building pricing process. The virtual non-existence of a
private equity market in the Philippines also means that most firms IPO with limited
foreign ownership, only allowing foreign capital to flow in through the public markets.
The more sophisticated shareholder base and management teams of countries such as
Japan that understand the book-building process may be the reason why non-book-built
IPOs disappeared rapidly in the country after the introduction of book-building at
relatively the same time as the Philippines.
In conversations with investors and underwriters in the Philippines, the
introduction of book-building has been over all a good thing for the Philippine economy.
Book-building encourages firms that may not have succeeded in a fixed-price offering or
auction due to a high amount of information asymmetry to access the public markets for
funding. IPO volume is clearly a sign of a more functional market. More importantly, the
scrutiny that comes with being a public company, which ironically recently has been
criticized for being a corrupter of incentives and a major friction in the US, in my opinion
is healthy for companies in the Philippines. Accountability and transparency forced upon
public firms are two qualities that a country that ranks in the top quartile for corruption9
should desire. Undoubtedly the IPO market in the Philippines in the next decade will not
9

According to Transparency International’s Corruption Index as of 2014
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exhibit the same features as I find in this paper. Institutional pressure against the SEC to
change the allocation requirements to local investors and to raise the fee cap will have
large effects if pushed through. The Philippines is projected to be the fourth fastest
growing economy of 2015 and inflows of both talent and capital from abroad will occur.
Balancing the needs of a bifurcated market consisting of multibillion dollar multinational
conglomerates and couple-of-million dollar SMEs will be a huge challenge, and the more
academic and practical research that is devoted to the topic, the better prepared my
country will be.
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IX. Figures
Figure 1: This page shows the different situations through which a company may list in
the PSE by way of introduction. Information is from Pg 1 of the March 9, 2011
memorandum by the PSE to the investing public and market participants on the subject of
Amended Rules on Listing by Way of Introduction
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Figure 2: This page is from the “Determination of Offer Price” section of the prospectus
of Crown Asia Chemicals Corporation (2015). It is an example of a non-book-built
offering, classified as such because the section doesn’t explicitly mention book-building.
Instead the final issue price is set by the underwriter and doesn’t incorporate information
from investors in pricing.
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Figure 3: This page is from the “Pricing and Dilution” section of the prospectus of
Jolliville Holdings Corporation (2002). It is an example of a non-book-built offer,
classified as such because it doesn’t explicitly mention book-building. Instead the issue
price is determined by an NAV calculation by the underwriter.
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Figure 4: This page is from the “Determination of Offer Price” section of the prospectus
of SBS Philippines Corporation (2015). It is an example of a book-built offering as
identified from the explicit mention of a book-building process in the first sentence of the
prospectus. Though the underwriter may perform calculations to determine a price range,
the final price takes into account information gathered through the book-building process.
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Figure 5: This figure shows the number of book-built IPOs, non-book-built IPOs and
total number of IPOs on the PSE in the Philippines per year since 1998.
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Figure 6: This figure shows the volume of total capital raised of book-built IPOs, nonbook-built IPOs and total number of IPOs on the PSE in the Philippines per year since
1998.
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Figure 7: This figure shows the sum of annual trading volume (left hand side axis) and
the closing price on the last day of the year (right hand side axis) for the Philippine Stock
Exchange Index (PSEi).
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Figure 8: This shows all IPOs on the PSE during the time period of January 1998 August 2015, both book-built and non-book-built, categorized by the primary sector the
company registered for their IPO.
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Figure 9: This shows all IPOs on the PSE during the time period of January 1998 August 2015, both book-built and non-book-built, categorized by the use of proceeds
mentioned on the IPO prospectus in the “Use of Proceeds” section. IPO prospectuses that
stated more than one use for the proceeds or said that the proceeds were for general use
were classified as “General”. IPO prospectuses that stated that the proceeds were only
going towards one specific business project, such as the purchase of a factory or an
acquisition of another company, were classified as “Specific project investment”. IPO
prospectuses that stated that the proceeds were only being used to pay down debt were
classified as “Debt repayment”.
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Figure 10: This figure shows additional information on IPOs on the PSE during the time
period of January 1998 - August 2015, both book-built and non-book-built. An IPO is
classified as oversubscribed if there was a follow-on offering for the IPO, meaning during
the original IPO there were more shares demanded than offered and the issuer decided to
offer more shares on either the same date or slightly later date. The average number of
underwriters shows how on average how many banks were listed as underwriters,
including the lead underwriter(s), on deals over the period. An IPO was classified as
having a top 10 lead underwriter if the lead underwriter on the IPO was in the top 10 on
the league table of equity deal volume in pesos in the Philippines from 1999 – 2015. An
IPO was classified as an international offering if there were shares offered and sold
outside of the Philippines.
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Figure 11: This figure shows the average underpricing of book-built IPOs during each
year, as measured as the percentage return using the IPO offering price and first
aftermarket trading price, during the time period of January 1998 – August 2015.
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Figure 12: This figure shows additional information on IPO-ing companies on the PSE
during the time period of January 1998 - August 2015, both book-built and non-bookbuilt. A company was classified as a subsidiary of a foreign corporation if in the
“Business overview” (or similar section) section of the IPO prospectus it is explicitly
mentioned that the company is a subsidiary of a company headquartered outside of the
Philippines. A company was classified as having majority non-individual shareholders if
more than 50% of the holders of common stock pre-IPO were not individual people. A
company was classified as having large foreign ownership if more than 30% of the
holders of common stock pre-IPO were registered as having a non-Filipino nationality.
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Figure 13: This figure charts all IPOs on the PSE during the time period of 1998 – 2015,
with the binary variable of whether or not the offer was book-built on the vertical axis,
and the log of the market cap of the IPO-ing company on the horizontal axis. The dotted
lines are a rough approximation of the range of companies which have similar market
caps but have a mix of book-built and non-book-built IPOs.
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X. Tables
Table 1: This table shows the criteria for listing on the different boards on the PSE prior
to 2013. Information was gathered from the “Philippine Stock Exchange” section of
multiple IPO prospectuses pre-2013.

First Board
Minimum years of
operation
Market
Capitalization
(mm)

Second Board

SME board

5

1

1

500 Php

100 Php

N/A




Other board
specific



Track record of
profitable
operations for 3
years





Net tangible
assets of at
least 500 Php
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Demonstrate
potential for
superior growth



Minimum capital
requirement of
100 Php



Prospects of
further growth
and
profitability
Authorized
capital stock of
20 Php - 100
Php
Track record of
at least 1 year
of positive
EBITDA

Table 2: This table from the PSE website (www.PSE.com.ph) shows the criteria for
listing on the two different boards on the PSE post-2013.

MAIN BOARD

SME BOARD
GENERAL CRITERIA

a.
b.
c.
d.

The Applicant Company must have a positive stockholders' equity in the fiscal year immediately
preceding the filing of the listing application.
The Applicant Company operating history of at least three (3) years prior to its listing application.
The Applicant Company shall cause all its subscribed shares of the same type and class applied for
listing to be paid in full.
The minimum offering to the public for initial listing shall be based on the following schedule:

Market Capitalization

e.
f.

g.

i.
ii.
iii.

Public Offer

Not exceeding P500M

33% or P50M, whichever is
higher

Over P500M to P1B

25% or P100M, whichever
is higher

Over P1B to P5B

20% or P250M, whichever
is higher

Over P5B to P10B

15% of P750M, whichever
is higher

Over P10B

10% of P1B, whichever is
higher

When required by the Exchange, the Applicant Company shall engage the services of an
independent appraiser duly accredited by the Exchange and the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") in determining the value of their assets.
The Applicant Company shall have an investor relation program to ensure that information affecting
the company are communicated effectively to investors. Such program shall include, at the
minimum, a corporate website that contains, at the minimum, the following information:

Company information - organizational structure, board of directors, and management team
Company news - analyst briefing report, latest news, press releases, newsletter (if any)
Financial report - annual and quarterly reports, at least for the past two (2) years
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MAIN BOARD
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.

SME BOARD

Disclosures - recent disclosures to PSE and SEC for the past two (2) years
Investor FAQs - commonly asked questions of stockholders
Investor Contact - email address for feedback/ comments, shareholder assistance and service
Stock Information - key figures, dividends, and stock information

TRACK RECORD REQUIREMENT
a.

b.
c.

A cumulative consolidated earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization
(EBITDA), excluding non-recurring items, of
at least P50 Million for three (3) full fiscal
years immediately preceding the application
for listing;
A minimum EBITDA of P10 Million for each
of the three (3) fiscal years; and
The applicant company must be engaged in
materially the same business(es) and must
have a proven track record of management
throughout the last three (3) years prior to the
filing of the application.

Exceptions to
requirement:

the

3-year

track

a.

b.

c.

record

A cumulative earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA),
excluding non-recurring items, of at least
P15 Million for three (3) fiscal years
immediately preceding the application for
listing;
A positive EBITDA was generated in at least
two (2) of the last three (3) fiscal years,
including the fiscal year immediately
preceding the filing of the application; and
The Applicant Company must be engaged in
materially the same business and must have a
proven track record of management
throughout the last three (3) years prior to the
filing of the application for listing.

The Applicant Company shall demonstrate its
stable financial condition and prospects for
continuing growth by providing a business plan
indicating the steps that have been taken and to
be undertaken in order to advance its business
over
a
period
of
five
(5)
years.

(i). The Applicant Company has been operating for at
least ten (10) years prior to the filing of the
application and has a cumulative EBITDA of at
least P50 Million for at least two (2) of the three
(3) fiscal years immediately preceding the filing of
the listing application;

As a general rule, financial projections are not
required, but should there be references made in
the business plan to future profits or losses, or
any other item that would be construed to
indicate forecasts, then the Applicant Company
is required to include financial projections in the
business plan duly reviewed by an independent
accounting firm.

(ii). The Applicant Company is a newly formed holding
company which uses the operational track record
of its subsidiary. However, the newly formed
holding company is prohibited from divesting its
shareholdings in the said subsidiary for a period
of three (3) years from the listing of its securities.
The prohibition shall not apply if a divestment
plan is approved by majority of the Applicant
Company's stockholders.
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MAIN BOARD

SME BOARD

MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENT
Minimum authorized capital stock of P500M, of
which, at least 25% is subscribed and fully paid.
At listing, the market capitalization of the
Applicant Company must be at least P500M.

Minimum authorized capital stock of P100M, of
which, at least 25% is subscribed and fully paid.

MINIMUM NUMBER OF STOCKHOLDERS
Upon listing, at least 1,000 stockholders each
owning stocks equivalent to at least one (1) board
lot.

Upon listing, at least 200 stockholders each
owning stocks equivalent to at least one (1)
board lot.

RESTRICTIONS
a.

b.

No divestment of shares in operating
subsidiary - A newly formed holding company
which invokes the operational track record of
its subsidiary to qualify for the track record
requirement of profitable operations, is
prohibited from divesting its shareholdings in
the said subsidiary for a period of three (3)
years from the listing of its securities. The
prohibition shall not apply if a divestment plan
is approved by majority of the Applicant
Company's stockholders.
No secondary offering for companies invoking
exemption of track record and operating
history requirements, such as mining,
petroleum and renewable energy companies
and newly formed holding companies during
the initial public offering.

a.
b.

c.

No listing of holding, portfolio and passive
income companies;
No change in primary purpose and/or
secondary purpose for a period of seven (7)
years following its listing; and
No offering of secondary securities for
companies exempt from the track record and
operating history requirements such as
mining, petroleum and renewable energy
companies.

LOCK-UP
An Applicant Company shall cause it existing
stockholders who own an equivalent of at least
10% of the issued and outstanding shares of stock
of the company to refrain from selling, assigning
or in any manner disposing of their shares for a

An Applicant Company shall cause its existing
stockholders to refrain from selling, assigning,
encumbering or in any manner disposing of their
shares for a period of one (1) year after the
listing
of
such
shares.

43

MAIN BOARD

SME BOARD

period of:

If there is any issuance or transfer of shares (i.e.,
private placements, asset for shares swap or a
similar transaction) or instruments which lead to
issuance of shares (i.e., convertible bonds,
warrants or a similar instrument) done and fully
paid for within six (6) months prior to the start of
the offering period, or, prior to listing date in
case of companies listing by way of introduction,
and the transaction price is lower than that of the
offer price in the initial public offering, or listing
price for listing by way of introduction, all
shares subscribed or acquired shall be subject to
a lock-up period of at least one (1) year from
listing
of
the
aforesaid
shares.

(i). One hundred eighty (180) days after the listing of
said shares if the Applicant Company meets the
track record requirements; or
(ii). Three hundred sixty-five (365) days after listing of
said shares if the Applicant Company is exempt
from the track record and operating history
requirements.
If there is any issuance or transfer of shares (i.e.,
private placements, asset for shares swap or a
similar transaction) or instruments which lead to
issuance of shares (i.e., convertible bonds,
warrants or a similar instrument) done and fully
paid for within One hundred eighty (180) days
prior to the start of the offering period, or, prior to
listing date in case of companies listing by way of
introduction, and the transaction price is lower
than that of the offer price in the Initial Public
Offering, or listing price for a listing by way of
introduction, all shares availed of shall be subject
to a lock-up period of at least Three hundred
sixty-five (365) days from full payment of the
aforesaid
shares.

The lock-up requirement shall be stated in the
Articles of Incorporation of the Applicant
Company.

The lock-up requirement shall be stated in the
Articles of Incorporation of the Applicant
Company.
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Table 3: This table shows descriptive statistics for the dataset of IPOs on the PSE from
January 1998 – August 2015. There are summary statistics for these four different sample
populations of the dataset: All IPOs in the dataset, only book-built IPOs in the dataset,
only non-book-built IPOs in the dataset, and only non-book-built IPOs in the dataset
excluding the IPO of ALHI. The table also displays the results of t-tests testing for the
difference between means of the different sample populations.

All

Entire
sample

Bookbuilding
(1)

Nonbookbuilding
(2)

70

42

28

# of
observations

Excluding
ALHI
Nonbookbuilding
(3)
27

T-test value

1=2

1=3

(0.37)

(0.33)

0.53

0.40

1.20

1.40*

1.23

1.42*

(0.36)

(0.60)

1.19

1.41*

1.21

1.42*

(3.70)***

(3.64)***

(3.16)***

(3.12)***

(2.32)**

(2.27)**

1.14

1.19

(2.06)**

(1.99)**

Panel (a) Capital market uncertainty
PSEi market runup (day -90 to day 0)
Std. Deviation

3.4%

3.8%

2.8%

2.9%

10.8%

11.0%

10.5%

10.7%

3.1%

3.0%

3.1%

3.1%

Panel (b) Total issue cost (% of IPO gross proceeds)
Average underwriter fees
Std. Deviation
Average Initial Return
Std. Deviation
Total Cost
Std. Deviation

0.5%

0.4%

0.7%

0.7%

10.7%

8.7%

13.8%

14.6%

17.3%

15.9%

19.2%

19.0%

13.8%

11.7%

16.9%

17.7%

17.3%

15.9%

19.2%

19.0%

2.8%

2.9%

2.8%

2.7%

0.7%

0.6%

0.8%

0.8%

Panel (c) Total issue cost (% of first aftermarket value)
Average underwriter fees
Std. Deviation
Average Initial Return
Std. Deviation
Total Cost
Std. Deviation

9.1%

7.4%

11.6%

12.4%

14.6%

13.6%

16.0%

15.7%

11.9%

10.3%

14.4%

15.8%

14.6%

13.6%

16.0%

15.3%

$3,823

$6,130

$362

$347

$6,961

$8,229

$556

$548

$2,759

$4,391

$311

$347

$5,619

$6,792

$545

$561

$1,064

$1,739

$51

$53

$3,078

$3,841

$155

$158

28.1%

27.0%

29.8%

30.0%

10.2%

10.7%

9.3%

9.4%

5.7%

7.9%

2.4%

2.5%

Panel (d) Offering characteristics
Total capital raised (Php mm)
Std. Deviation
Primary capital raised (Php mm)
Std. Deviation
Secondary capital raised (Php mm)
Std. Deviation
Average % of company equity offered total
Std. Deviation
Average % of company equity offered secondary
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Std. Deviation

11.1%

13.1%

5.9%

6.0%

$16,550

$26,640

$1,407

$1,340

$33,290

$40,020

$1,916

$1,920

1,416

2,224

159

163

Std. Deviation

3,142

3,822

288

292

Age of issuing firm

15

18

10

10

Std. Deviation

15

17

10

10

$12,080

$10,110

$15,180

$522

$47,390

$14,170

$74,770

$855

$1,706

$1,417

$2,145

$72

$6,948

$2,290

$10,770

$176

25.4%

16.9%

39.7%

40.4%

41.9%

23.7%

59.2%

60.4%

Panel (e) Company characteristics
Market cap (Php mm)
Std. Deviation
Number of employees

Sales revenue (Php mm)
Std. Deviation
Net Income (Php mm)
Std. Deviation
Last year's sales growth
Std. Deviation
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(3.33)***

(3.27)***

(2.79)**

(2.74)**

(2.29)**

(2.20)**

0.42

(3.37)***

0.42

(2.98)***

2.17**

2.19**

Table 4: This table shows the results of a linear regression of different factors against the
binary dependent variable of whether an IPO is book-built or not. The outlier of ALHI is
excluded from the sample. Because of the binary nature of the dependent variable, the
signs on the coefficients can indicate the direction of the relationship but the magnitudes
of the coefficients are not directly interpretable.
(1)
book-built

VARIABLES
runup

0.774
(0.599)
0.264
(0.372)
0.000588
(0.00459)
5.55e-06**
(2.18e-06)
0.964
(0.596)
-0.106
(0.276)
-0.0966
(0.137)
0.155
(0.375)
-0.414
(0.287)
-0.160
(0.170)
-0.475
(0.299)
-0.564*
(0.304)
-0.183
(0.182)
-0.609**
(0.256)
-0.360
(0.224)
0.416
(0.304)
0.719***
(0.172)

negativeearnings
age
mcap
shareofequity_s
largeforeignshareholders
nonindividual
subsidiaryofforeigncorp
HoldingFirms
Industrial
MiningandOil
Property
Services
SME
Projectinvestment
Debtrepayment
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

47

69
0.355

Table 5: This table shows the marginal effects of a probit regression of different factors
against the binary dependent variable of whether an IPO is book-built or not. The outlier
of ALHI is excluded from the sample. In this regression, the coefficients represents the
marginal increase in probability that the binary variable equals 1 given a 1 unit change in
the independent variable and holding all else equal.
(1)
book-built

VARIABLES
runup

-8.44e-05
(0.000574)
-3.59e-06*
(2.31e-05)
2.14e-08**
(1.37e-07)
0.000401
(0.00267)
-0.000145
(0.00111)
-3.74e-05
(0.000244)
1.42e-05
(9.93e-05)
-1.000***
(0.000641)
-5.24e-05
(0.000365)
-0.297*
(0.633)
-0.00578
(0.0302)
-5.74e-05
(0.000429)
-0.000938
(0.00595)
-3.39e-05
(0.000290)
1.51e-05
(0.000105)

age
mcap
shareofequity_s
largeforeignshareholders
nonindividual
subsidiaryofforeigncorp
HoldingFirms
Industrial
MiningandOil
Property
Services
SME
Projectinvestment
Debtrepayment

Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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69

Table 6: This table shows the results of linear regressions on the two components of total
issue cost: underwriter fees (here as a percentage of issue price) and underpricing (here as
a percentage return of first traded price from issue price). The outlier of ALHI is
excluded from the sample.
VARIABLES
runup
age
lyrev
top10uw
o.international
capitalraised_t
bbage
bblyrev
o.bbtop10uw
bbinternational
bbcapitalraised_t
Constant

(1)
uwfees_issue

VARIABLES

-0.00184
(0.00664)
0.000131
(0.000102)
1.30e-06
(2.02e-06)
0.00280
(0.00286)
-

runup

-3.64e-06
(2.84e-06)
-8.79e-05
(0.000108)
-1.39e-06
(2.03e-06)
-

capitalraised_t

-0.000525
(0.00342)
3.69e-06
(2.85e-06)
0.0297***
(0.00100)

bbinternational

age
lyrev
top10uw
o.international

bbage
bblyrev
o.bbtop10uw

bbcapitalraised_t
uwfees_issue
Constant

Observations
69
R-squared
0.083
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(2)
return_offer
0.269
(0.215)
-7.35e-05
(0.00335)
6.64e-05
(6.53e-05)
-0.0200
(0.0931)
-5.00e-05
(9.31e-05)
0.000703
(0.00352)
-6.94e-05
(6.57e-05)
-0.0464
(0.110)
5.17e-05
(9.33e-05)
-5.528
(4.205)
0.286**
(0.129)

Observations
69
R-squared
0.157
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: This table uses a sub-sample of 17 IPOs which are either 1) book-built and have
a market cap under 1 billion Php or 2) non-book-built and over 1 billion Php. The results
of a linear regression, which is the same as that run in table 4, of different factors against
the binary dependent variable of whether an IPO is book-built or not are shown. Because
of the binary nature of the dependent variable, the signs on the coefficients can indicate
the direction of the relationship but the magnitudes of the coefficients are not directly
interpretable.
(1)
bookbuilt

VARIABLES
runup

-0.238
(1.698)
0.352
(0.380)
-0.0233
(0.0254)
-7.14e-10*
(3.07e-10)
-0.730
(2.066)
1.173*
(0.543)
0.0793
(0.237)
-

negativeearnings
age
mcap
shareofequity_s
largeforeignshareholders
nonindividual
o.subsidiaryofforeigncorp
3.sector

-0.546
(0.288)
1.163
(1.124)
1.863
(1.252)
-0.0142
(0.338)
-

4.sector
5.sector
6.sector
2o.useofproceeds
3.useofproceeds

-1.620
(1.522)
1.620***
(0.264)

Constant

Observations
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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17
0.931

Table 8: This table uses a sub-sample of 17 IPOs which are either 1) book-built and have
a market cap under 1 billion Php or 2) non-book-built and over 1 billion Php. The results
of linear regressions, the same as those shown in table 6, on the two components of total
issue cost: underwriter fees (here as a percentage of issue price) and underpricing (here as
a percentage return of first traded price from issue price) are shown.
(1)
VARIABLES

uwfees_issue

VARIABLES

runup

0.00401
(0.00676)

runup

age

-8.55e-05
(6.09e-05)

age

lyrev

-2.71e-12*
-1.35E-12
-

lyrev

o.top10uw

o.top10uw

o.international

-

o.international

capitalraised_t

-8.93e-12*
(4.00e-12)
4.61e-05
(0.000141)
0
(0)
-

capitalraised_t

bbage
bblyrev
o.bbtop10uw

bbage
bblyrev
o.bbtop10uw

o.bbinternational

-

o.bbinternational

bbcapitalraised_t

-0
(0)
0.0371***
(0.00286)

bbcapitalraised_t

Constant

uwfees_issue
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

17
0.544

Observations
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(2)
return_off
er
1.731**
(0.596)
0.0244***
(0.00601)
-6.19e10***
(1.50e-10)
-1.53e09**
(4.63e-10)
0.0341**
(0.0122)
8.43e-10
(4.36e-10)
-8.02e09***
(1.99e-09)
-98.87**
(34.96)
4.520**
(1.321)
17
0.862

